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« 11 » if, as Halprin suggests, the “confu-
sion of our politics” is equally a result of a 
flawed design process that is too dependent 
on narrowly defined goals and insufficiently 
sensitive to feedback, then, perhaps, it is not 
going too far to expand Glanville’s audacious 
claim that science is but a subset of design 
and make a similar claim regarding gover-
nance; a term that is, after all, also common-
ly understood to be virtually synonymous 
with the term “cybernetics.” a conception 
of governance informed by the kind of sec-
ond-order cybernetic approach to design 
espoused by Glanville and encapsulated 
in sweeting’s article would have no option 
but to acknowledge openly the inevitability 
of error and eliminate the peddling of sup-
posedly iron-clad, fool-proof “solutions” in 
which the politicians of every liberal de-
mocracy currently traffic. and where might 
that lead us? But that is a conversation for 
another time.
« 12 » sweeting’s article does valuable 
work in consolidating Glanville’s legacy of 
design cybernetic theorization as it evolved 
alongside a growing awareness within the 
design research community that first-order, 
non-reflexive “scientific” models are insuffi-
cient to deal with the emergent functional, 
aesthetic and ethical complexities of ac-
tual design practice. This provides a robust 
foundation from which a whole generation 
of cybernetic designers influenced by Glan-
ville (Thomas Fischer, Candy Herr, Michael 
Hohl, tim Jachna and others) can further 
develop and disseminate this rich body of 
theory and practice to the generations to 
come. as a theorist/practitioner who in-
dependently evolved a recursive, conver-
sational approach to design so thoroughly 
embodying the ethical commitments of 
second-order cybernetics, an additional re-
flection upon the work of Halprin has much 
to offer this on-going endeavour.
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> Upshot • This commentary supports 
Sweeting’s case for the relationship be-
tween the design tradition, second-order 
cybernetics and second-order science. It 
argues, however, that the extension of 
this argument to other intellectual tradi-
tions and areas of practice is complicated 
by differing views of material agency.
« 1 » The main focus of Ben sweeting’s 
target article is to examine the terms “design” 
and “second-order cybernetics,” together 
with the practice designated by them, and to 
discuss their relationship. This task is simply 
described, but leads inexorably into deep 
waters, in part because of the entangled re-
lationship between the terms, and in part be-
cause both terms are contested. in the main, 
sweeting navigates this complexity with skill, 
but inevitably there are loose ends in the ar-
gument, which are worth pulling on to see if 
they lead to further insight.
« 2 » The argument is founded on sweet-
ing’s analysis of ranulph Glanville’s ideas on 
design and second-order cybernetics (soC), 
a task that he is particularly well-positioned 
to undertake, given his long relationship with 
Glanville as both a student and a collaborator. 
sweeting cites Glanville as stating that “cyber-
netics is the theory of design and design is the 
action of cybernetics” (§2), and reports that 
“Glanville […] characterises all research as 
being a design-like activity” (§14) and that he 
“recognises design research as a self-reflexive 
activity of researching research” (§15). on the 
basis of Glanville’s work, exemplified by the 
above quotations, sweeting makes the core 
proposal of the article, suggesting that
“ Glanville’s understanding of design, and par-
ticularly his […] account of the relations between 
design and science […], allows us to view the cur-
rently expanding field of design research as a con-
temporary variety of soC practice.” (§6)
This proposal is both well-founded and use-
ful.
« 3 » i also find Glanville’s argument 
regarding the relationship between science 
and design, and sweeting’s discussion of it, 
to be convincing: “design is, it follows, the 
more general case and, therefore, ‘it is inap-
propriate to require design to be ‘scientific’: 
for scientific research is a subset (a restricted 
form) of design…” (§7). The argument is in 
line with the critique made by authors such 
as stuart umpleby (2014) and Karl Müller 
(2014), who have contributed greatly to sec-
ond-order science (sos), to which sweeting 
dedicates a substantial section. This critique 
focuses on the important role of the scientist 
as an observer and active constructor of the 
scientific process, a role that is systemati-
cally erased from positivist accounts of sci-
entific activity.
« 4 » sweeting thus establishes two 
alignments: between design research and 
soC, and between design and sos. The 
question that arises in the reading of the 
article is the degree to which it is possible 
to extrapolate from the alignment between 
these discourses in order to draw conclu-
sions that are applicable to science as it is 
carried out beyond the cybernetic tradition 
and to design that is carried out without a 
reflexive turn.
« 5 » When Glanville spoke about de-
sign, he did so not as an external observer 
surveying the field, but as a participant 
explaining his experience of the process 
of design (including his design of musical 
environments and performances). indeed, 
given the view of cybernetics that he sus-
tained and lived by, we should not expect 
anything less. sweeting does not discuss 
Glanville’s practice but implies that it was in 
line with Horst rittel’s argument that “‘ev-
erything goes’: because designers inevitably 
encounter new and ambiguously defined 
situations (it being the purpose of design to 
create the new), they have no well-defined 
problems to solve or enumerable lists of 
options to pick from” (§13), and that the 
problems encountered by designers are 
“wicked” (§8) because of their complex in-
ter-dependencies. Much design practice is 
illuminated by an analysis conducted from 
this position, but many design problems 
are perceived by designers in much simpler 
terms, and are not seen as being wicked. 
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The Chambers dictionary definition of the 
verb “design” is “to develop or prepare a 
plan, drawing or model of something be-
fore it is built or made,” and readers will be 
able to confirm that other dictionaries have 
similar definitions. This definition includes 
many contexts where designers are con-
vinced that they are working with well-de-
fined problems, and that enumerable lists 
are available, including much of the field of 
engineering. a reading of sweeting’s article 
with a focus on this issue is complicated 
by the fact that the logic of the argument 
leads to thematic sections that discuss both 
design research (which necessarily has a 
reflexive aspect) and design (which, in the 
view of many practitioners, does not neces-
sarily involve a self-reflexive aspect).
« 6 » The designers of scientific instru-
ments such as the CErn particle collider 
have a well-defined goal, in this case to pro-
vide an apparatus capable of detecting the 
Higgs Boson. But even in design that does 
not involve engineering, well-defined prob-
lems can be identified. The builders of musi-
cal instruments provide a good example of 
designers who have well-defined problems 
with lists of options. iris Bremaud describes 
the choice of woods for construction in the 
case of the designers of xylophones and slit-
drums in africa:
“ Many species could be encountered in either 
xylophones designed for temporary use, or slit 
drums with strong aesthetical meaning, involv-
ing the ability of wood to be intricately carved 
[…]. on the contrary, the more prominent the 
purely ‘acoustic’ function of instruments was, the 
higher the proportion of use of Pterocarpus […]. 
This choice is nearly exclusive in most elaborate 
xylophones and in slit-drums that were used for 
message transmission – up to more than 10 km 
distances.” (Bremaud 2012: 812)
These designers are clearly making choices 
from a list of predefined options, and de-
ploying their design expertise in making the 
trade-off between the contrasting benefits 
of different materials and the range of pre-
defined purposes to which the instrument 
will be put.
« 7 » in a rather different musical con-
text, Brian Eno, often described as a sound 
designer, also explains the act of creating a 
musical composition in terms of selection:
“ What the composer had was a kind of menu, a 
packet of seeds, you might say. and those musi-
cal seeds, once planted, turned into the piece. and 
they turned into a different version of that piece 
every time.” (Eno 2011)
Eno relates this approach to the influence of 
stafford Beer, and perhaps this cybernetic 
connection should not be surprising given 
the importance of selection in cybernet-
ics since the early work of Claude shannon 
(1948).
« 8 » The purpose of this digression into 
music, a field that was one of Glanville’s main 
areas of activity, is to argue that there exist 
design practices that are well-defined, in-
volve selection from a list of pre-determined 
options, or both. i suggest, therefore, that 
sweeting’s characterization of design is best 
seen as an accurate description of a particu-
lar type of design. it may also be an argument 
and exhortation to other designers who do 
not share these ideas or practice to consider 
more deeply the recursion involved in their 
design activity, and i believe that this was the 
intention of much of Glanville’s work. The 
question arises, however, how far (if at all) it 
is possible to make a convincing argument 
about design in general on the basis of this 
soC analysis to those who do not share the 
epistemological position of the field, a chal-
lenge that is common to soC as a whole. i see 
sweeting’s discussion of andrew Pickering as 
being central to this question.
« 9 » sweeting cites Pickering exten-
sively, and mostly with approval. However, he 
disagrees with Pickering’s characterization of 
soC as “a turn away from the more tangible 
modes of experimentation that characterized 
earlier phases of cybernetics, and towards the 
linguistic.” sweeting counters this argument 
by pointing out that “soC is a reflection on 
the performative involvement of observ-
ers within their observations” (§5), but that 
the opportunity to carry out this function 
was limited because the field of cybernet-
ics had “broken up” (§19) by the time that 
soC emerged. i have some sympathy with 
this view, but nevertheless i believe that it is 
incumbent on those who feel there is value 
in the heritage of cybernetics to investigate 
Pickering’s point more deeply. specifically, 
we need to assess the degree to which the risk 
that sweeting identifies that soC can become 
“overly introverted” (§6) may have played an 
active part in the break up of the field. sweet-
ing’s concern is not to conduct such an inqui-
ry into the decline of cybernetics, but rather 
to explore how its legacy can be applied and 
revived in design research. nevertheless, i be-
lieve that there is a key point at issue here, as 
i now discuss.
« 10 » The examples that are given of 
Pickering’s performative approach can in-
deed be situated within soC (r. d. Laing’s 
work on therapists, Pask and the participant 
observer). But there are many aspects of Pick-
ering’s thinking about the performative that 
are not easily situated in this way. Pickering 
describes his conception of the performative 
as an “…image of science, in which science is 
regarded as a field of powers, capacities and 
performances, situated in the machinic cap-
tures of material agency” (Pickering 1995: 7). 
in his book The Mangle of Practice, Pickering 
examines the history of the bubble chamber 
in physics research. He argues that we should 
see this as a “dance of human and material 
agency” (ibid: 51). Pickering goes on to de-
scribe how…
“ [r]esistance (and accommodation) is at the heart 
of the struggle between the human and material 
realms in which each is interactively restructured 
with respect to the other – in which, as in our ex-
ample, material agency, scientific knowledge, and 
human agency in its intentional structure and its 
social contours, are all reconfigured at once.” 
(ibid: 67)
Here, i think, is the heart of the problem of 
the generalizability of insights from soC. 
The idea that the object of investigation (or 
design) has material agency that pushes back 
at the scientist (or designer) is one that sits 
uncomfortably with an soC view of con-
structivism, and certainly of the radical con-
structivist tradition within soC as exempli-
fied by Ernst van Glasersfeld (1995). to put 
it another way, the conception of the perfor-
mative within design research as described 
by sweeting, and perhaps within soC as 
a whole, may be different from that which 
Pickering proposes.
« 11 » in my view, soC does not neces-
sarily preclude the ascription of agency to the 
material world. For example, the reformu-
lation of the scientific method undertaken 
by Humberto Maturana (1990: 18) implies 
constraints on our ability to engage with the 
583
what Can Cybernetics Learn from Design?  Christiane M. herr
second-order Cybernetics
               http://constructivist.info/11/3/572.sweeting
agency of the material, but it does not pre-
clude its existence, and is compatible with 
Pickering’s “mangle of practice.” The analysis 
proposed by sweeting, however, does not en-
compass the agency of the material. He does 
mention “the ways in which material arte-
facts operate variously as part of the research 
process, as the object of enquiry, as output or 
dissemination and sometimes as more than 
one of these depending on their context” 
(§30), but there is nothing to suggest that the 
physical world “pushes back” at the designer, 
or even that such a thing might be possible. i 
do not see this as a problem for the analysis 
proposed by sweeting per se, as the design 
practice described may indeed consist of a 
recursive interaction between the designer, 
the design and the people for whom it is in-
tended. Moreover, from a radical constructiv-
ist perspective, it may be argued that the per-
ception of material agency is no more than a 
perception, and that a methodology based on 
this is intellectually misleading and practical-
ly unreliable. it does, however, raise a prob-
lem for the claim that design is a category that 
subsumes science. sweeting’s argument that 
scientific activity is a kind of design holds for 
a broad definition of design, but the specifi-
cally soC view of design put forward in this 
article does not map well onto mainstream 
conceptions of science. The same applies 
even to first-order cybernetics in the perfor-
mative mode, for example for Grey Walter, 
whose robotic “tortoises” addressed a well-
defined problem: “to model goal seeking and, 
later, learning. But he did so as economically 
as he could” (Boden 2006: 244). The problem 
of mapping from design to science can be re-
solved in one of two ways. one option is to 
broaden our understanding of design so that 
it includes material agency, in line with Pick-
ering’s mangle of practice. This would enable 
the insight from soC into the role of the de-
signer in a recursive process of construction 
to be generalized across the whole range of 
scientific and design activities. alternatively, 
we can make it clear that we are adopting a 
critical view of science, engineering and craft. 
This would embrace the differences between 
different types of design and scientific prac-
tice, and challenge practitioners to question 
the externality of the material agency that 
they ascribe to the surrounding environ-
ment and independent of themselves. There 
is indeed a role for such a practical critique. 
sweeting refers to “pre-defined methods that 
were characteristic of philosophy of science” 
in the 1970s, but a glance around the bodies 
funding research today would show that this 
preference for pre-defined methods is alive 
and kicking.
« 12 » divergent opinions on the perfor-
mative may in turn account for sweeting’s 
disagreement with Pickering on the linguistic 
turn in soC. sweeting comments that “soC 
is a reflection on the performative involve-
ment of observers within their observations” 
(§5). However, material agency is at the core 
of Pickering’s view of the performative but is 
not represented in design seen from a soC 
perspective, as represented in this article. 
Consequently, from Pickering’s perspective 
soC is lacking an account of material agency 
and its effects, whereas sweeting does not 
discuss any such lack. it is the discrepancy 
on this lack, i suggest, that leads Pickering 
to identify a linguistic turn in soC, and also 
leads sweeting to disagree with him.
« 13 » in conclusion, the important con-
tribution of this article is to bring together 
and extend the thinking of Glanville, and to 
show how this can both inform design re-
search and serve as “continuing or reinvent-
ing cybernetic concerns” (§35). in doing this, 
sweeting offers a much-needed response to 
the lack of practical research being carried 
out within soC, a concern that Glanville also 
shared. in doing this, the article also raises 
important issues, going beyond its main fo-
cus, about the nature of the relationship be-
tween second- and first-order cybernetics 
and the possible role of material agency as a 
point at issue in the understanding of the per-
formative in these two aspects of cybernetics.
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> Upshot • Based on Sweeting’s central 
question of what design can bring to cy-
bernetics, this commentary extends and 
adds further depth to the target article. 
Aspects discussed include the nature of 
practice in relation to design, the intro-
duction of designerly ways of acting and 
thinking through acting to cybernetics, 
and the re-introduction of material ex-
perimentation typical of early cybernetics.
Differentiating externally motivated 
application and internally 
motivated practice
« 1 » Ben sweeting’s focus on the rela-
tionship of cybernetics and design presents 
a valuable counterpoint to recent attempts 
at renewing interest in cybernetics by fram-
ing it primarily in reference to science (§24). 
Based on ranulph Glanville’s (2007c: 1178) 
characterization of design as the action of 
cybernetics, and cybernetics as the theory of 
design, sweeting positions design research 
as a variety of second-order cybernetic 
(soC) practice (§4). This central point of 
sweeting’s article deserves further strength-
ening, as practice is not to be understood 
in this context as the application of theory 
(§§6–10). as argued by sweeting based on 
Glanville (2014a, 2015) (§3), soC should 
not be conceived of as a theory preceding 
and determining subsequent action. When 
seen from the perspective (and experience) 
of design, theory is more appropriately un-
derstood as a framework for making explicit 
thoughts developed in and through action. 
While generated from action, such a theory 
can then also be used for abstract argument 
and analysis, but this should not be seen as 
its primary purpose. design reasoning is 
typically implicit: a form of thinking imma-
nent in, expressed, and developed through 
acting. This is illustrated in donald schön’s 
(1991) well-known characterization of de-
sign processes as reflection in action. it is 
this recognition of the fundamental involve-
ment of the observer in the process that sets 
